INVISIBLE CITIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
DOUGLAS H. HsIAo
Studying how direct democracy' works in the United States feels a
bit like watching a Harold Pinter play. Pinter takes perverse and misogynistic people and presents them in a context with which we are familiar
and comfortable-the family living room. We see hit men who talk
about the boredom of waiting for their next assignment 2 and the father
who presents the family offer to his eldest son's wife for her concubine
services. 3 Our eyes see a family living room, but our ears hear something
entirely different. We try to accept them as though they are part of our
world. They are, in fact, completely severed from our moral context; we
instinctively try to place them in our context but are unable. The referendum and initiative are, in the same way, severed from our contextour constitutional context-but we do not realize it.
One feels the same uneasiness with direct democracy as with watching Pinter's plays, but one cannot identify the source of these feelings.
The power of direct democracy lies in its rhetorical "feel"; it "looks" and
"sounds" like it is part of our constitutional fabric. Who can really disagree with power in the hands of the people? 4 But direct democracy
warps our republican constitutional scheme while cloaking itself behind
the cloth of its vocabulary: democracy and popular sovereignty.
1. Direct democracy refers to the referendum, the initiative, and the recall. Although most
commentators treat all three together, this Note will use direct democracy as a shorthand term for
only the referendum and initiative. The referendum is a mandatory vote to approve or disapprove a
law passed by the legislature. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 2 (1989). An initiative is a law that is written and voted upon
by the populace. Id. The recall, as a voting device, more closely mimics what voters are supposed to
do: choose their representatives. The recall allows voters to discharge duly elected officials from
their offices by vote. Id. at 125. It is a device of a different kind. Even though there are dangers
inherent in the recall, these would be more properly treated in a different work.
2. See Harold Pinter, The Dumb Waiter, in TWENTIETH CENTURY DRAMA: ENGLAND, IRELAND, THE UNITED STATES 622 (Ruby Cohn & Bernard F. Dukore eds., 1966).
3. See HAROLD PINTER, THE HOMECOMING (1965).
4. Even the term "direct democracy" conveys an idea that one finds hard to reject. I use the
term because it is the most familiar shorthand for referenda, initiatives, and recalls. Some other
writers prefer other, less biased terms such as "direct legislation." See, eg., DAVID B. MAGLEBY,
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984).
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The historian Edmund Morgan identifies the idea of popular sovereignty as the source of direct democracy and the point at which we began
to distort and separate from our Republic:
The political world of make-believe mingles with the real world in
strange ways, for the make-believe world may often mold the real one.
In order to be viable, in order to serve its purpose... a fiction must
bear some resemblance to fact. If it strays too far from fact, the willing
suspension of disbelief collapses. And conversely it may collapse if
facts stray too far from the fiction that we want them to resemble.
Because fictions are necessary... we often take pains to prevent their
collapse by moving the facts to fit thefiction, by making our world conform more closely to what we want it to be. We sometimes call it, quite
appropriately, reform or reformation, when the fiction takes command
and reshapes reality. 5
Morgan's point is that we create fictions to gloss over those things that
we cannot accept. And as facts seem to conflict with our fiction, we do
not abandon the fiction; rather, we distort the facts to make them fit
within the fiction. In the same way, we created the fiction of popular
sovereignty (the idea that the people are the wellspring of all political
power) because we could not face the reality of being a people of the
many led by the few. The people began to realize at the end of the nineteenth century that, at bottom, popular sovereignty had little real meaning, that they were helpless to exert direct control on their governance.
Gigantic corporations seemed to dominate their entire existence, 6 and
politicians were simply venal. 7 Instead of abandoning the fiction of popular sovereignty, the progressives of the early twentieth century moved
"the facts to meet the fiction" by inventing direct democracy. Those supporters of direct democracy waved the flag of popular sovereignty; but, if
Morgan is right, they were waving a long-faded banner.
Consider this Note an attempt to put direct democracy back into
our constitutional context and to examine whether it belongs there.
From the very beginning, there was a meaningful and vigorous debate
over the wisdom of direct democracy.8 Proponents of direct democracy
5. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 14 (1988) (emphasis added); see also id at 54 ("Was there any way that
... the whole people, the fictional people, could materialize and act apart from their representatives
... ? New answers, new devices to bring the facts toward the fiction are invented from time to
time.").
6. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN To F.D.R. 74 (1955).
7. See id at 184.

8. See,

ag., JAMES BOYLE, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: ITS FOLLY, FALLACIES,

AND FAILURE 15 (3d ed. 1912) (early polemic against direct democracy with the assertion on its
cover, "This book tells you what you ought to know").
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glorified their cause and impugned the motives of their opponents, 9 while

opponents gleefully noted that Napoleon and Adolph Hitler thought di-

rect democracy was a useful tool to their designs on power. 10 But in
recent times, as the number of referenda and initiatives have exploded
upon the political landscape, few voices have been raised in protest. Like
having a bear seated at the dinner table, the people feed it to keep it
happy while never asking why it sat to dine in the first place."
The recent rise in the use of direct democracy has been attributed to

the people's disaffection with the legislative process. 12 When particular

passions catch hold of the people, they become frustrated with the snail-

like pace of legislative action. 13 Legislatures that avoid the tough issues
or handle the tough issues with poor results have, instead of solving the

problems internally, given over their imprimatur to a wave of measures
prompted by the people. Referenda and initiatives in the 1980s have covered some of the most contentious areas of politics: gun control,14 envi17
ronmental law,' 5 the right to die,' 6 English as a state's official language,
tax refunds and caps,18 the criminalization of marijuana, 19 and legislative
term limitations.2 0 They reflect a growing frustration with the political
process and attempt to preempt a rational legislative process.
9. See JUDSON KING, THE STATE-WIDE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, S. Doc. No. 736,
64th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1917) ("Organizations of the producing classes such as farmer's unions,
granges, labor organizations, and reform leagues are for them. They are strenuously opposed by all
the big trusts and corporations, the reactionary politicians of all parties, nearly all the corporation
lawyers, and every corrupt political boss in the United States.").
10. See CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY
AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 536-67 (rev. ed. 1950).
11. Alasdair MacIntyre's allegory of the moral catastrophe may be more appropriate than
mine. MacIntyre supposes that there was a catastrophe in the history of humanity after which we
recovered all the words of our morality but had no real context to understand what they really
meant. We still continue to use the words, but our use of them is really nonsense. See ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 1-5 (2d ed. 1984).
12. See Robert Pear, Number of Ballot InitiativesIs the GreatestSince 1932, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1990, at All.
13. A classic account of the unbridled passions of the people can be found in the story of
Coriolanus. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, CORIOLANUS.
14. See Cal. Prop. No. 15 (1982).
15. See Cal. Prop. No. 128 (1990) [hereinafter Big Green].
16. See Wash. Init. No. 119 (1991).
17. See Cal. Prop. No. 63 (1986).
18. See Mass. Measure No. 3 (1986).
19. See Alaska Ballot Measure No. 2 (1990).
20. See, eg., Cal. Prop. No. 140 (1990); Colo. Amend. No. 5 (1990); Wash. Init. No. 552
(1991). The irony of term limitations should not be lost. On the one hand the people seem to be
saying "We hate you" but on the other, "I can't stop myself from voting for you!" Term limitations are like voluntary commitment; we fear our own irrationality. But, humor aside, the paradox
points out a more fundamental truth about voting behavior; as Arrow noted, there is no one distinct
voice of the people. The majority is statistically unpredictable and contradictory. See KENNETH
ARROW, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); see also Bernard Grofman
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This Note does not argue that
referenda and initiatives are products of iconoclastic impulses. Direct democracy comes from both the left

and the right, reflecting both the best of progressive populism and the
worst of the reactionary. But the wheat, here, cannot be separated from
the chaff. Direct democracy provides a dangerous outlet for disaffected
groups with racial biases or special interests who try to impose their nar-

row, limiting vision on society. This Note concludes that direct democracy can only lead to a majoritarian, superficial homogeneity and, at
worst, to the tyranny of the majority.
Recent commentators have acquiesced to direct democracy's existence while wondering how to control it.21 George Will 22 and Derrick
Bell 2 3 have railed against direct democracy while Ralph Nader and the

reactionary American English movement espouse its use. Conservatives
do not seem to know which side to take: The American Enterprise Institute has crusaded against the device,2 4 while conservative tax reformers
like Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann gained their fame through direct democracy. 25 Those on the left, too, have grave misgivings about the dangers of uncontrolled majorities. 26 This kind of confusion is a product of
cognitive dissonance-the Pinteresque quality-caused when the rheto-

ric of direct democracy feels right, but our mind cannot fully accept it.
Like opposing soldiers wearing the same uniforms, the hazy line of

"who's on my side" is no longer so clear, and we look more fondly upon
battles where two trenches faced each other and let the bullets fly without regret.2 7 That is what progressives find so utterly mystifying, how to
both acknowledge the grandeur of direct democracy while attacking it as

the excess of power. Opponents of direct democracy should never grant
& Scott Feld,
83 AM.
POL. SC. REv. 1317, 1320-21 (1989) (describing how the Arrow Theorem and the French political
philosophers Rousseau and Condorcet relate); id. at 1335 (justifying representative democracy because of "practical impossibility of a pure democratic form" shown by Condorcet).
21.
Julian N. Eule,
99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
22.
George F. Will,
WASH. Posr, Oct. 25, 1990, at A23.
("Recourse to ballot propositions represents rejection of the core principle of representative government: The people do not decide issues, they decide who shall decide.").
23.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
51
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978).
24.
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, THE REFERENDUM DEVICE (Austin Ranney ed.,
1981) (symposium organized by the American Enterprise Institute to critique direct democracy).
25.
Amy Pyle,
13, L.A.
TIMES, June 6, 1988, at B1l.
26.
Eule,
note 21, at 1584.
27. Professor Eule's conclusion to his article is illustrative of this kind of liberal uncertainty,
what he calls his "lingering doubt."
Eule,
note 21, at 1584-86;
H.N. Hirsch,
14 POL. THEORY
423 (1986). Hirsch is less than sympathetic to liberalism: The word "threnody" is a kind of mournful dirge.
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the proponents their basic premise that it has some hallowed place in our
Republic. Direct democracy is not "pure" democracy but is rather a
perversion of democracy, or, as Tom Stoppard might say, a travesty. 2 8
This Note argues in Part I that any project that suggests to reform
the direct democracy process is doomed from the beginning. The history
of the direct democracy movement shows that it was built on false pretenses, and any reform-regardless how well-meaning--can only fail, or
worse, exacerbate the problem. Part I focuses on the recent work of Julian Eule2 9 and other reformers of direct democracy who have argued
that direct democracy should be subject to more stringent judicial review. This Note, although agreeing in principle with Eule that direct
democracy has serious flaws, disagrees with his proposed solution. Eule
wants to have it both ways: to preserve the device but to curb its use. I
argue that direct democracy is unconstitutional. The "progressive" project must be scrapped, no matter how drastic this solution appears at first.
blush. Maintaining the status quo does far more damage to our democratic Republic than to abandon this travesty of one.
Direct democracy has no place in the scheme allowed by our Constitution or envisioned by the Framers of this Republic. As James Madison
observed, the aggregation of the power of governance in one source is the
very definition of tyranny. 30 Once one begins to understand the meaning
of both Madison's philosophy and the constitutional Guaranty of a Republican Form of Government, 31 the "make-believe" quality of direct
democracy will begin to expose itself.
The constitutional context into which direct democracy must be
placed is not bereft of any points of reference. One need not rewrite the
Constitution to find that direct democracy does not fit within it. In fact,
the Framers gave the federal government a powerful tool, the Guaranty
to the states of a Republican Form of Government. Although the states
were, in a sense, laboratories of the Republic-to experiment with different forms of government-these experiments could not go outside the
bounds of what would be acceptable under the Constitution. The Guaranty Clause 32 set such a limit on the laboratory. Part II of this Note
shows how the Guaranty of a Republican Form of Government can be
read to find direct democracy out of bounds in our constitutional scheme.
28. See TOM STOPPARD, TRAvEsTIEs (1975). Stoppard meant a travesty as not merely in the
colloquial sense, but as being a "broad and grotesque parody on a lofty work or theme." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1290 (2d. college ed. 1985).

29.
30.
31.
32.

See Eule, supra note 21.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 211 (James Madison) (Charles A. Beard ed., 1948).
See U.S. CONT. art. IV, § 4.
I will refer to Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution as the Guaranty Clause.
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The first obstacle to such a conclusion, however, is the traditional
(and anachronistic) view that the Guaranty Clause is nonjusticiable. In
two separate but intertwined decisions, Luther v. Borden 33 and Pacific
States Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon,34 the Supreme Court held that
any issue concerning the Guaranty Clause was a political question that
the courts could not and would not answer. Since the beginning of this
century when these cases were decided, the courts have held fast to the
nonjusticiability of the Guaranty Clause, while at the same time the
political question doctrine itself has been crumbling. Part II(A) will examine the history of the political question doctrine beginning with Luther v. Borden and PacificStates. It will next examine the shaky status of
that doctrine since Baker v. Carr 35 and conclude that it is inconsistent
with precedent and the present state of the political question doctrine to
hold the Guaranty Clause non-justiciable.
Finally, Part II(B) argues that the Guaranty Clause bars the use of
direct democracy by the states because it is not a Republican Form of
Government. What many might find unsatisfying about recent commentary on the Clause is that virtually no one will venture a definition of
"republican." Without outlining some contours of the meaning of "republican," determining the constitutionality of direct democracy would
be impossible. This Note argues that neither the fiction of popular sovereignty nor any past or current meaning of "republican" can support the
constitutionality of direct democracy. The Framers of the Constitution
never intended that any state be allowed to have any direct form of democracy in the governance of the state's affairs. The FederalistPapers
and other historical documents make this clear. 36 The political thinkers
who contributed to designing the blueprint for the United States drew a
sharp distinction between what was a republic and what was a democracy. They thought that the United States would be a republic-not a
democracy-and that the Guaranty Clause would make this decision explicit. The definition of what is republican, then, necessarily excludes
that which is democratic.
Recent politics have blurred the distinction between republican and
democratic to the point where most Americans today would probably
think the terms synonymous. 37 The civic republican movement has
emerged to realign American political thought with its republican roots
33. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
34. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1972).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 206-17.
37. And to confuse matters even more, our political parties also use the terms democratic and
republican.

Vol. 41:1267]

STA TUS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

1273

and to distinguish it from rank democracy. The question then becomes
whether the emerging definition of republican reserves a place for direct
democracy. This Note identifies the significant anti-republican aspects of
direct democracy and cautions civic republicans tempted by its siren
song. In so doing, it addresses the important treatments of civic republicanism by Michael Walzer3 8 and Benjamin Barber.3 9 They illustrate the
two approaches: Walzer finds republicanism and direct democracy incompatible; Barber finds them perfectly compatible. They reach these
diametrically opposed positions because they have different conceptions
of republicanism. Walzer refuses to stray too far from the civic republican idea of community and thus is led to reject direct democracy. 4° Barber advocates direct democracy in his community but has to strain the
meaning of community to such a degree as to make his framework nonsensical. 4 1 This Note concludes that contemporary republicans should
see that direct democracy is contradictory to the logic of republicanism.
No meaning of "republican" garnered from history, from the Framers,
or even from contemporary republicans can shield direct democracy
under its umbrella. The Guaranty Clause must lead courts to find direct
democracy unconstitutional.
In Invisible Cities,42 Italo Calvino imagines Kublai Khan sitting
with Marco Polo and listening to the stories of the wondrous cities that
Polo encountered in his travels. These cities are "invisible" because they
exist solely in the minds of the two men, one through imagination, one
through memory. 43 But the stories that Marco Polo relates really tell a
story about how people create their desires and then shape the world
around those desires. The desires-or what I have called fictions-take
hold of reality and create, out of whole cloth, new worlds and new cities
that have an existence (if any) only in the mind.
Direct democracy is a manifestation of our deepest political desires.
We passionately want to see that our government of the people, by the
people, and for the people does not perish from this earth. But these
desires have taken control of reality-making direct democracy fit with
our Republic when in fact it has nothing to do with our Republic. To the
citizen, direct democracy is "the city of his dreams." 44 But Calvino says
38. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUAL-

iTY (1983).
39. See BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE (1984).
40. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 304.
41. See BARBER, supra note 39, at 150-56.
42. ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES (William Weaver trans., 1974).
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id. at 8.
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there is "one difference" between the real city and the dreamed-of city:
"The dreamed-of city contained him as a young man; he arrives at [the
real city] in his old age. In the square there is the wall where the old men
sit and watch the young go by; he is seated in a row with them. Desires
are already memories. '4 5 Sometimes our own desires outstrip reality,
and when we arrive at reality, we are shocked to find that we are only
living out an empty dream. Regretfully, direct democracy is one dream
that has imposed itself upon and twisted our Constitution. The longer
we live with the dream of direct democracy, the desires for direct democracy become memories that direct democracy always existed.
I.

FLYING

BuTrESsEs,

FILTERING, AND THE FAILURE OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Flying buttresses stand as a testament to gothic architecture's misunderstanding of the physical laws of gravity. Medieval architects
wanted their cathedrals to soar to the heavens but could not do so without the walls collapsing under the huge force of the weight above. So the
architects created a new kind of support-the flying buttress-to make
up for their mistakes rather than rethinking the theory behind the cathedral design. The structure of direct democracy is like a gothic cathedral
that needs support from below by the buttressing of the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment, and state-created
procedures. The higher direct democracy has sought to soar in the twentieth century, the more necessary has the heavy buttressing from judicial
review become. We have arrived at a stage where the flying buttresses
have corrupted the pristine vision of direct democracy. This vision of
direct democracy has been corrupted wholly because the original
blueprint was laid upon a faulty architectural foundation-what historians have identified as the myth of popular sovereignty.
A.

Mythmaking: The Rise of DirectDemocracy in the Twentieth
Century

In the early 1900s, the political machines and large corporations became the targets of a new politics: the progressive movement. Richard
Hofstadter's definitive history of this era describes the movement's goal:
45. Id. A more accessible expression of Calvino's ideas can be found in a Doonesbury cartoon
by Garry Trudeau. The scene: Michael Doonesbury and Zonker walk in the snowy forest outside
their home. Zonker recalls all the frivolity and pranks of their college years. Doonesbury pauses.
Doonesbury: Uh ... Zonker?

Zonker: Yes, Mike?
Doonesbury: We never did any of those things.
Zonker: I know. But one day we'll think we did.
GARRY B. TRUDEAU, DOONESBURY DOSSIER: THE REAGAN

YEARS

(1984).
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[T]o restore popular government as they imagined it to have existed in
an earlier and purer age. This could be done... only by revivifying
the morale of the citizen, and using his newly aroused zeal to push
through a series of changes in the mechanics of political life-direct
primaries, popular election of... initiative, referendum, recall ... and
the like. 46
No matter how invigorating a vision this is of the Republic, this brief
description identifies some of the design flaws of direct democracy. For
one, the idea that there was a time when there was popular government
"in an earlier and purer age" is for the most part incorrect. The utopian
visions of old puritan towns in New England voting upon every issue is a
fabulist's concoction. In fact, many historians point out that the Puritan
political experience was in some ways "hierarchical" and "authoritarian." 47 The people were ruled by their churches and their elders. In
fact, the idea of pure democracy is one that was rejected quite early on in
colonial America. One hotly debated issue in pre-Revolutionary
America was whether the "instruction" (a vote held by the people to
instruct their representatives how to vote in Parliament) should be made
binding upon the representative. Extensive analyses of the history of the
binding instruction have concluded that the "movement to make instructions binding failed completely. '48 To urge that America was somehow
drifting away from its democratic roots is tantamount to building the
history of the Republic upon a fallacy.
Furthermore, the progressives took a device and implanted it in a
patient with which it was completely incompatible. The progressives saw
what they believed were successful uses of direct democracy in Switzerland,4 9 New England, 50 and ancient Athens,5 1 and thought the lessons
learned in those communities could be brought to this Republic. But the
transplant of direct democracy was premised upon the fact that there was
a willing host that had a revivified sense of morality. Richard Hofstadter
46. HoFSTADTER, supra note 6, at 257.
47. See Joshua Miller, DirectDemocracy and the PuritanTheory ofMembership, 53 J. POL. SCI.
57, 60 (1991). Miller notes that Puritans, although a source of democratic theory, thought of themselves as "an elected aristocracy"; see also id. at 62 (describing the political structures within the
Puritans' religious organization).
48. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 215; see also JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 96-109 (1989) (discussing generally the history
of the instruction and its failure to fully take hold in the nascent Republic); infra text accompanying
notes 187-89 (discussing the binding instruction).
49. See CRONIN, supra note 1, at 48; ELLIS P. OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN
AMERICA 100 (1912).

50. See Alan Simpson, How Democratic Was Roger Williams?, 13 WM. & MARY Q. 53, 65
(1956) (questioning the belief that New England was democratic by saying that "the skeptical doubts
are unquenched").
51. See, eg., MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 31 ("[Many American Progressives traced the concept of direct legislation to ancient Athens. .. ").
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asserts that progressives imagined that there was a new man-John Q.
Public-who was to charge into the new century and "address himself
directly and highmindedly to the problems of government. '5 2 This allegorical "Man of Good Will" would be "intellectualistic" and "it was assumed that somehow he would really be capable of informing himself in
ample detail about the many issues that he would have to pass on, and
that he could master their intricacies sufficiently to pass intelligent judgment. '5 3 The assumption, however, proved wrong. It was wrong because a political device that worked on a small scale in a different time
could not work on a far more complex society and political context. For
example, the proponents of direct democracy use the Puritans as an example of a successful direct democratic framework. While it is true that
at some points in history there was no hierarchy in town government, the
Puritans lived in a society in which the church hierarchy took the place
of many of the political frameworks of town government.5 4 The Puritans
were, for the most part, homogeneous and closely knit-bound together
by the Church.55 More importantly, the Puritans came from a political
background quite hostile to liberalism; 56 membership in a community
was something to be earned, not merely assumed, and members were not
equal. 57 The contrast to America in the early 1900s could not be more
stark; Hofstadter remarks that the machinery of direct democracy "was
less adapted to the realities of the highly organized society of the late
nineteenth and the twentieth century" and was therefore "found of very
limited use." 58 In effect, torn away from the context (the Yankee-Protestant ideal) whence it came, direct democracy was "unintelligible" 59 and
"without meaning." 6° In examining the history of contemporary direct

52. HOFSTADTER, supra note 6, at 261.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. See Miller, supra note 47, at 60.
55. Id. at 59.
56. Id. at 61.
57. Id. at 63-64. This structure is comparable to the communitarian model of government.
Communitarians posit that smaller, more cohesive communities where virtue and tradition can be
emphasized will return society to a more organic state. The Communitarian vision will be examined
more closely infra text accompanying notes 219-26.
58. HOFSTADTER, supra note 6, at 261.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 267 (discussing HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 213-24 (1914)).
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democracy, 6 1 one can begin to see its flawed design and its shaky
62
foundations.
B.

The Inadequacy of Filtering

Considering the mythological history of direct democracy, one must
question whether further buttressing can restore direct democracy and
provide a sound design to preserve it for the future. Yet the reformers of
direct democracy are making the same fundamental mistakes when they
argue that the flaws of the referendum and initiative can be corrected by
judicial pre-passage review of procedural regularity and post hoc review
of constitutionality. Professor Julian Eule's recent article 63 illustrates the
growing misgivings over direct democracy by the inheritors of the progressive movement. Professor Eule has all the premises fight: He sees
the problems and dangers, but his solution is to retain the status quo.
Eule sees the solution to majoritarian excesses as stringent filtering by
courts using expanded judicial powers under the Equal Protection Clause
and the First Amendment. He views the "[ftederal court invocation of
the Bill of Rights ... [as] the only line of defense against majoritarian
64
tyranny."
The problem with Eule's argument is threefold. First, on a practical
level, the question of how and when to filter has proved an intractable
61. The same sort of analysis can be made of ancient Athens and Switzerland, though, for the
reader, on a rudimentary level these societies are obviously different from twentieth-century
America. For the Greek perspective, see Patricia Springborg, The Primacy of the Politica" Rahe
and the Myth of the Polls, 38 PoL. STUD. 83, 84 (1990), which argues that proponents of a return to
ancient Greek traditions have mythologized ancient Greek society and ignored all the problems and
differences, specifically, the absence of women from politics. See also ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CITICS 28 (1989) (arguing that because the Greeks disdained representative government, they realized that government on a large scale was impossible). For the Swiss perspective, see
JAMES MILLER, ROUSSEAU: DREAMER OF DEMOCRACY (1984), which points out the paradox that
Rousseau "was instrumental in propagating the image" of Switzerland as "an ideal democracy"
when "most cantons were in fact oligarchies." Id at 41 (footnote omitted).
62. With such a questionable structural basis, the problems of attempting to reform direct democracy are much easier to identify. One might argue that to truly restore the original vision of
direct democracy, the flying buttress of judicial review should be completely eliminated; its removal
would return the pristine lines of the original progressive's vision. This view found a powerful ally in
Justice Hugo Black's defense of direct democracy in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Justice Black stated that the initiatives like the one at issue in Reitman are as near to democracy as one
could get in America. This remark was made in a spirited exchange with then-Solicitor General
Thurgood Marshall in oral arguments before the Court. See 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 672 (Philip B.

Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); see also Eule, supra note 21, at 1506. But this "solution"
merely ignores the problem. Surely eliminating judicial review would cause a complete collapse of
the process. The addition of more judicial review is inadequate, but the total absence of any judicial
review would be a far worse situation.
63. Eule, supra note 21.
64. See id. at 1584.

1278

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:1267

problem. 65 Second, judicial filtering has proved inadequate, and
strengthening the courts' power as a filter does not address all the
problems. 66 Third, and likely disconcerting to those opposed to judicial
activism, the courts have been particularly creative in finding direct democracy unconstitutional. 67 In other words, when the courts become the
final filter (maybe the only filter), in desperation they resort to very ex68
pansive and creative interpretations of the Bill of Rights.
1. The Efficacy of the Courts as Filters. When one advocates a
stronger role for the courts to filter direct democracy, one should first
examine how well-equipped the courts are to do the job. The courts perform best when they have clear issues presented before them, with a complete record, in a timely context, and with strong advocates representing
both sides. That is why the federal courts have constitutional and prudential rules of justiciability.6 9 This paradigm of justiciability, however,
is often not available in the review of direct democracy: The issue is
opaque; the record is bare; the case is not ripe; and the parties are sometimes hard to determine. The judges themselves are constrained by time
and their interest in maintaining either their seats (in the case of elected
state judges) or the public respect for the institution of the judiciary.
In fact, when one reads the work of the direct democracy reformers,
one will be struck by their constant attention to the rules of justiciability
and the efficacy of the courts. 70 They read these rules as obstacles to
solutions but do not seem to realize that there are some good reasons
why those obstacles were put in place. The approach of reformers is to
find out how to make a referendum or initiative reviewable, rather than
to examine why direct democracy may be an inherently poor subject of
judicial review. For example, Professor Eule presents what appears to
be a perfect, logical proof: (1) Filtering must be done; 7 1 (2) only state
courts or federal courts can filter;72 (3) state courts are inappropriate to
65. See infra Part I(B)(1).
66. See infra Part I(B)(2).
67. See infra Part I(B)(3).
68. This argument is derived in part from Eric H. Zagrans's article on Section 1983 actions,
"Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model ofSection 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499
(1985). Zagrans argues the converse, i.e., that expansive liability under Section 1983 led to more
opportunities for the conservative Burger and Rehnquist Courts to restrict substantive rights.
69. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JUISDICTION 43-124 (1989) (detailing the prohibition
on advisory opinions, standing, ripeness, and mootness).
70. See, eg., Eule, supra note 21, at 1579-84 (concluding that state courts are less suited to
serve as filters than federal courts); James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-ElectionReview
of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 304-13 (arguing that rules of justiciability can be overcome in certain types of cases).
71. Eule, supra note 21, at 1549.
72. Id. at 1579 ("[T]he question remains which judicial system is best suited for the role.").
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filter;73

therefore, (4) federal courts should be the filter.74 Q.E.D. The
logic, however, contains a missing premise, that is, that federal courts are
appropriate filters. If, in fact, that also can be negatived, then the proof
does not work. Professor Eule, however, never discusses whether the
federal courts can themselves provide the ifiter to the majoritarian tyranny he so much fears.
Filtering by the judiciary takes two general forms: procedural and
substantive review. Procedural ifitering is done by state courts, since the
procedures are created under the state constitution or statutory law. 75 In
California, for example, there are several important requirements for direct democracy. 76 The initiative or referendum has to cover a single subject;7 7 proponents must procure valid signatures from five percent of the
electorate in order to place the measure on the ballot;78 and the full text
must be submitted to the state within a certain time period. 7 9 If the procedural requirements are not met, the state will not place the measure on
the ballot. This kind of filtering, however, entirely depends on what the
80
state accorded to ensure that small groups could not co-opt the process.
Invariably, as long as there is procedural regularity, the measure will be
placed on the ballot regardless its subject matter.
The most effective ifitering courts can perform concerns the constitutionality of direct democracy. Constitutional ifitering (either based on
state constitutions or the United States Constitution), though, has great
costs to the judiciary. The courts are like ships hazarding the Scylla of
pre-passage review and the Charybdis of post-passage review. If pre-passage, as some commentators have suggested as a possibility,8 1 the problem of justiciability arises. The court would be rendering an advisory
73. Id. at 1580 (concluding that there is "little hope that state courts will have either the ability
or the desire to take a leading role in filtering").
74. Id. at 1584.
75. For a comprehensive coverage of state requirements for direct democracy, see MAGLEBY,
supra note 4, at 36-44.
76. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8-10.
77. Id. § 8(d). The single subject requirement has been construed by the California courts as a
substantive requirement of direct democracy and thus has been read as non-reviewable until after the
passage of the measure. See Douglas C. Michael, Note, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the
Initiativein Voter Protection, 71 CAL. L. Rv. 1216, 1227 (1983).
78. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b), § 9(b).
79. Id. § 9(b) (West Supp. 1991). The procedural requirements for initiatives were themselves
amended by Proposition 109 in 1990. Id.
80. See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 65-70 (detailing studies which show that signature-gathering is the most difficult aspect of getting a measure on the ballot).
81. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 70, at 318. Gordon and Magleby criticize pre-election
review except in two cases: first, where a "present, significant, irreparable injury to a fundamental
public interest" is involved, and second, where there is procedural irregularity. Id. Their article
presents the problems that result from pre-election review; they do not seem to realize that most of
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opinion.8 2 Further, the case is not ripe, in that it would be a waste of
judicial resources to rule on the constitutionality of a law that has not
been passed.83 But the institutional costs are arguably even greater when
the filtering is done after passage of the legislation. It is one thing, as one
California Supreme Court justice pointed out, to declare a legislative act
unconstitutional, but it is quite another to declare the act of the people
unconstitutional and to overthrow the voice of the people. 84 Chief Justice Rose Bird, also of the California Supreme Court, learned that lesson
well when the voters of California removed her from her seat on the
court. The electorate purportedly was disillusioned with a court that
first tried to limit the breadth ofP5 and then consistently skirted the death
penalty statute which had been passed by referendum.8 6 The institutional costs to the judiciary sap the authority of the courts and place
them in the role of an anti-majoritarian police officer.
The preceding discussion does not distinguish which kind of court is
doing the reviewing. The distinction, however, is very important. State
courts have advantages in being free from most of the justiciability doctrines created by the Supreme Court. In fact, several states with direct
democracy do provide for advisory opinions from state courts. 87 State
courts, however, are vulnerable to the problems of political influence.
One wonders how a state judge who faced re-election in the following
year would rule on the constitutionality of an issue which had the approval of, say, 77% of the electorate. Professor Eule thinks the danger is
too great. 88 He effectively argues that "[d]irect democracy ... poses a
peculiar threat to state judicial independence. Judicial fitering of [referenda and initiatives] calls for nonaccountable judges." 89 He reasons that
if federal courts were created in order to insulate judges from the vagaries of local politics, this appears to be the ideal situation for those courts
to act upon those issues which are most vulnerable to local politics.
the problems they identify also exist in post-election review. Post-passage review may even exacerbate some of them.
82. See id. at 304-09.
83. See id at 309-11.
84. See Eule, supra note 21, at 1583 (quoting former Justice Joseph Grodin of the California
Supreme Court).
85. See People v. Ramos, 639 P.2d 908 (1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
86. Justice Bird's removal reflects the kinds of problems raised by the recall. Although the vote
was not technically a recall, members of the Supreme Court of California, 15 years after their appointment, must face a removal election. The lessons to be learned are the same about political
accountability for judicial decisions. See Joel Sappell, Death Penalty Controversy Trails Bird, L.A.
TIMEs, May 14, 1990, at Al.
87. See, eg., MAss. CONsT.ch. III, art. 2.
88. See Eule, supra note 21, at 1579-84 (giving anecdotal evidence of the state judiciary being
constrained by political pressure).
89. Id at 1584.
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Eule's suggestion that federal courts step to the fore, however, hides
its underlying assumption that the federal courts themselves are up to the
task. Federal courts will only be able to review ballot measures after they
are passed because of the justiciability problem. Justiciability, however,
is not merely a matter of constitutional law, it is also an exercise in prudence. Federal courts need to conserve their resources while making
well-reasoned decisions. They need situations which provide them "concrete controversies best suited for judicial resolution." 90 Direct democracy thrusts cases before federal courts with virtually unmanageable
matters.
A special problem that arises with initiatives is statutory construction of such laws and was treated in a recent work. 9 1 That Note advocates that the "traditional" method of interpreting legislation be used or
else the judiciary will have "usurped" the voice of the people. 92 It is
unclear, though, what this voice is and whether there ever is an ascertainable intent. Because if it is the people who are the lawmakers, how are
we ever to reconstruct their intent? If we merely take the drafters' intent
(e.g., from the pamphlets handed out to voters, as is suggested), are we
completely trivializing the people's voice? The problem becomes even
more complicated when one is presented with an initiative like Big
Green. 93 If a voter cannot possibly have even read the initiative while in
the voting booth, is it meaningful to try to reconstruct the intent of their
vote?
The Supreme Court has the luxury to choose cases in which issues
are presented clearly and unencumbered by extraneous matters. The
courts that review direct democracy, however, have to take what is
presented. Sometimes, even the parties are hard to discern. For example, in a case involving the constitutionality of an 'English only' initiative
in Arizona, the circuit court had to first sort out who the parties to an
appeal were before they could rule on the merits.94 Because the state
constitutional amendment was passed despite the objections of then-Governor Rose Mofford-the named defendant-she had no inclination to
expend her resources to defend the case in court. After losing in federal
district court in Yniguez v. Mofford,95 the proponents of the initiative
90. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 69, at 40.
91. See Elizabeth A. McNellie, Note, The Use of ExtrinsicAids in the Interpretationof Popularly EnactedLegislation, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1989).
92. See id. at 157.
93. Cal. Prop. No. 128 (1990).
94. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991). The appeal is still pending.
95. 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990); for a more complete discussion of the decision, see infra
text accompanying notes 115-17.
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wrangled over whether they were the proper party on appeal. 9 6 The
problem of justiciability (in the prudential sense) is present, where the
issues are not concrete and the parties are not even adverse to each other.
The Ninth Circuit held, oddly, that the sponsors of an initiative are the
equivalent to legislators and are thus entitled to intervene, even if the
97
only named party refuses to appeal.
Finally, whether or not the federal court does its job as a filter, the
majoritarian tyranny has already occurred. When the people of Arizona
mandated that English was the language to be spoken in the state, they
had already done damage to the psyches of those for whom English was
not their native tongue. When Californians voted on whether those
stricken by AIDS should be quarantined or not, even though the initiative was defeated, one has to wonder whether the people should be allowed to even put such questions to vote. It worries one to think that the
federal courts were the "only line of defense" had that passed.
Once the reformers agree (as they all do) that filtering is imperative,
they reflexively convince themselves that there is a time determinate and
a locatable court where judicial review can be efficaciously performed.
They just need to find it. The reformers take their conclusion and work
backward in their logic. They are like the archeologists who test each
ancient cloth they find in the Middle East to determine whether it is the
shroud of Turin.98 They do not stop to consider that the hypothesis they
test itself may be wrong. These reformers of direct democracy never consider the possibility that there is no time and no place when filtering can
be properly done. This conclusion that there can be efficacious filtering
of direct democracy is simply the result of an improper construction of
the problem. The obstacles to effective filter mechanisms and the stakes
are both too high to make this mistake.
2. No Exit: Filtering's Inadequacy in Curbing Public Choice.
The primary problem with post-passage filtering, however, is that it normally only takes the form of determining whether the legislation violates
individual rights. Although that is an important (maybe the most important) function of filtering, the process ignores a whole slew of other kinds
of referenda such as public safety referenda. The First Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause buttresses are quite powerful in curbing
such initiatives as the one that declared English the official language of
96. See Yniguez, 939 F.2d at 727.
97. See id.at 733.
98. The shroud of Turin, legend has it, is the cloth in which the body of Jesus was buried.
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Arizona 99 or the one which would place AIDS-stricken patients in quarantine in California. 100 Nuclear power referenda, however, are unlikely
candidates for equal protection review. The filters simply do not apply to
certain types of direct democracy. It is this type of direct democracy
which presents a wholly different challenge to judicial review. The problem, here, is not majoritarian tyranny (with which Eule's article concerns
itself) but is the problem of public choice run rampant.
One would assume that the purpose of referenda and initiatives is to
create an instrument to give reality to political choices by the public. As
political scientists have argued for years, voters do not bother to vote
because they do not believe that they have any influence in the political
choices made by their representatives. 101 Direct democracy corrects this
inertia by eliminating the middle man. 10 2 There are generally two major
problems with this theory of pure democracy: First, it assumes that majorities are rational; second, it assumes that a referendum or initiative can
properly capture the desired policy choice. These two assumptions, however, are not directly addressed by the proponents of direct democracy.
They are, instead, assumed away-as a matter of common sense or a
mere problem of construction-when, in fact, these assumptions contain
major flaws. With a referendum or initiative, there is no exit; once the
voter has stepped into the booth, she cannot step out until she has made
a choice. 0 3 That choice might be wholly irrational or a choice between
lesser evils.
Consider, for example, a voter presented with the 1988 Massachusetts proposition to close the commonwealth's two nuclear power plants,
Yankee Rowe and Plymouth; at the time, Yankee Rowe had an unassailable safety record, whereas Plymouth had an abysmal one. Of course,
voters exist along the whole spectrum of this issue, but one can probably
categorize them into several broad groups that represent the spectrum:
1) Nuclear power at whatever cost;
2) Close any unsafe plant. Because Plymouth is unsafe, it should be
closed, but Yankee Rowe should stay open;
3) Close any unsafe plant. Because Yankee Rowe and Plymouth are
unsafe, they should both be closed;
99. Ariz. Amend. 5 (1988); Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990) (blocking the
initiative on First Amendment grounds).

100. Cal. Prop. 64 (1986).
101. See Demetrios Caraley, Elections and Dilemmas of American Democratic Governance: Reflections, 104 POL. SCL Q. 19 (1989).
102. Of course, it may be precisely this "inertia" that was intended by the Framers, in the same
way that separation of powers was meant to curb unrestrained congressional, judicial, and executive
power.
103. See MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 188 ("Under direct legislation the decision is limited to a
yes or no response to a typically complex issue.").
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4) Close any unsafe plant. Because Yankee Rowe and Plymouth are
both safe, they should not be closed;
5) No nuclear power plants, no matter what.
Both (1) and (5) represent possible irrational voter preferences. In other
words, they may be guided by motives that do not correspond with the
common good, i.e., they are not practicing democracy. Of course this
does not mean that these preferences are irrelevant. Take, for example,
the person who opposes nuclear power upon his belief that no nuclear
power plant is safe. Despite evidence that the possibility of other kinds
of power plants (because of their number) have a greater likelihood of
being fatal to the general public than a nuclear plant, this person refuses
to vote to keep them open. In other words, if there was full information,
this voter would be voting against his own interests. There is quite a bit
of evidence for this kind of voter irrationality. As one commentator has
argued: "Because voting is essentially cost free, it is conducive to extremes of altruistic and malicious expression, both of which tend to be
dampened by the cost structure of private undertaking." 104
But worse, what the referendum and initiative do is skew the result
to the irrational group. The result is that, like a prism, the beams of one
group become merged with those of another and train only one indistinguishable beam down onto the floor. Referenda and initiatives do this by
taking a practical infinity of political preferences and funnelling them
into two choices, often termed "voter overload."1 05 Preferences (2), (3),
and (4) are rational choices to be made by the policymaker. Although
one may disagree over precisely what is "safe," or whether Yankee Rowe
and Plymouth are in fact safe, we would likely not argue that the choices
are irrational. If I believe that Yankee Rowe is safe, Plymouth is unsafe,
and I am a rational voter, how do I vote? Whatever choice I make is
skewed to a view that I did not want, even implicitly, to endorse. The
proposition was defeated in Massachusetts, but consider the consequences of the vote. It leads political leaders to believe that the majority
of Massachusetts voters believe that Plymouth is a safe plant. No one
will now take action against Plymouth when the people themselves approved of keeping it open. What if, more seriously, the proposition
passed and the majority of voters fell into preference (2), i.e., closing one
104. Geoffrey Brennan & Loren E. Lomasky, Introduction to POLrrICS AND PROCESS: NEW
ESSAYS IN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 55 (Geoffrey Brennan & Loren E. Lomasky eds., 1989). Professor Susan'Rose-Ackerman aptly sums up this view, which she labels the "Virginia School," as meaning that "[a] vote should be understood as meaning only that the individual preferred to vote for a
particular policy, not that he or she prefers the policy itself with its associated costs and benefits."
Susan Rose-Ackerman, JustifyingDemocracy: A Review Essay, 106 POL. ScI. Q. 313, 314 (1991).
105. See BARBER, supra note 39, at 203. The problem of overload occurs where "an infinite
number of alternatives [is] placed on what is a finite agenda." Id.
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but not the other, but they voted to close both because Plymouth was
simply too dangerous to keep open. The referendum gave them absolutely no way to express that preference. In other words, the rational
voter with a definite policy preference has been bundled up with irrational voters and ignorant voters to create a result that does not even
06
express a policy choice preferred by a majority of voters.'
Big Green, the comprehensive environmental initiative in California, provides another useful illustration of the overloading problem.
What if Big Green's failure to pass was based on the twenty percent of
voters who believe in unrestrained big business and forty percent of those
who believe that, although existing environmental protection laws are
insufficient, the protections presented by Big Green were incomprehensible, too expensive, or too comprehensive. The remaining forty percent
believe in the passage of Big Green. It is quite clear, then, that a majority--eighty percent-believes in the further regulation of the environment rather than the status quo. But this was expressed as one
indistinguishable group of sixty percent of the voters saying "no." What
kind of "voice" is this? The danger is that the California legislature will
shy away from environmental protection laws because the people have
said "no" to them. The irrational voters, thereby, have their view leveraged by the rational voters to appear much larger than they are in fact.
Benjamin Barber offers a two-level answer to the question on how to
solve the problem of voter overload. On the first level, he critiques the
critics and says that "[tihese questions lead to paradoxes in part because
liberal democrats pose them in the vacuum of abstract rationality, where
they are stripped of historical and political context ....-" 1 o 7 This is the
common refrain of communitarians such as Barber: that one cannot understand a system when one stands outside of it. This, however, has a
simple retort: That's your problem, not mine. The communitarians have
conceived of a system of an entirely new order. They assume away the
existence of a fundamentally stable system based on a constitutional
106. One interesting study applied economic frameworks to analyze spending behavior in school
districts that set their school budget by referendum. See Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal,
BureaucratsVersus Voters= On the PoliticalEconomy ofResourceAllocation by DirectDemocracy, 93
Q.J. ECON. 563 (1979). The study takes expenditure "setters" as those people who set the figure that
the referendum is to be voted upon. The study assumes that there is some fall-back ("reversion
point") figure if the ballot measure fails to pass. The study found that the larger the gap between the
fall-back figure and what the median voter found to be an optimal figure, the higher the actual
expenditure eventually voted upon. Therefore, "expenditures are generally greater, and never less,
than the expenditure level for the competitive [no referendum] model." Id. at 564. One could conclude that the referendum is akin to blackmail for the median voter: the worse the result of not
paying the blackmail, the higher the voter is willing to pay. At best, the study shows that resource
allocation is generally less efficient when done by direct democracy.
107. BARBER, supra note 39, at 203.
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framework. The communitarians have the burden of justifying their system with the given premise that we already have a republic in place.
To be fair to Barber, he is one communitarian who does not retreat
from the implications of his new system and offers practical solutions.
At the second level of his solution, he conceives of a voting ballot that
offers several choices.' 0 8 Barber suggests that referendums and initiatives
could give voters multiple options in their vote. Although no state in the
Union has such a system, 109 Barber claims that certain parts of Switzerland have used such a ballot with some success.110 He provides a sample
referendum ballot on the public funding of abortion which contains two
"YES" options and three "NO" options.II Although this may solve the
difficulties of voter overload, his solution creates far more intransigent
problems. First, again, Barber has assumed there will be a reawakening
of the dormant voter. A multichoice ballot presumes that a voter will be
informed on the choices and will make a reasoned decision. Barber expects that citizens will feel reconnected to their governance and will seize
the day. Remember, however, that this is precisely what the progressives
of the early part of the 1900s thought would happen to the citizenry in
their time. This proved to be a fatal flaw in the progressive movement, 112
and it appears that Barber is doomed to repeat history.
A second problem with the Barber ballot is that when it delimits the
options for the voter, it effectively ousts some citizens of their right to
vote. Voters are told exactly how their vote can be expressed, and further expressions are not available. This problem is not solved by more
choices, because every voter has a legal right to express an infinite
number of preferences. The power to set the agenda is necessarily the
power to eliminate voters. For example, in Barber's ballot, there is no
option for a voter to express that he is a strong supporter of abortion
rights but does not believe in federal funding of a health clinic of any
kind. This person is automatically going to be included in a group with
whom he has no political will in common. Or one can return to the
voting spectrum created for the nuclear power plant closure in Massachusetts and pretend that it is a hypothetical ballot." 3 What of a voter
108. See id. at 286.
109. Massachusetts, in fact, expressly does not allow it.
110. See BARBER, supra note 39, at 286 n.41.
111. See id. at 286. One of the options is "(4) NO: I am opposed to the proposal to support

abortion clinics from public funds in the way it is formulated here, but I am not necessarily against
abortion clinics in principle. I suggest the proponents reformulate and resubmit their proposal." Id.
112. See supra Part I(A).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
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who does not want Plymouth Nuclear Power plant to remain open because she finds the name morally reprehensible since Plymouth represents a colony which took away Native-American lands? She has no vote
on this ballot. In a "yes" or "no" vote, she can at least express that
intention. In a vote where options are limited, she cannot vote for the
option she wishes.
The only way to capture properly voter intention is to have a ballot
which allows every citizen to write in her purpose for voting the way she
did. This, of course, would eliminate any benefit Barber's proposal
would have because no legislator would be able to read every voter explanation. I am arguing, then, that any kind of ballot is unable to capture
policy preferences on one issue. A yes or no ballot necessarily bundles
voters together whereas a multichoice ballot unfairly limits the options
which should be available to a voter.
3. The Failureof the FinalFilter. Professor Eule acknowledges
that "[t]raditional equal protection doctrine may be ill-equipped to afford
protection" for certain types of referenda and initiatives.' 14 For example,
in a recent lower court case, Yniguez v. Mofford, 115 which involved an
initiative declaring English as the official language of Arizona, the new
law was struck down as being violative of the First Amendment.' 16 The
referendum was in the form of a state constitutional amendment that
would have required all state agencies and employees to conduct their
affairs in English. The court reasoned that such a law violated the First
Amendment because it was overly broad restriction on speech. The
court was faced with a novel issue in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Although this law may have been borne of racism and xenophobia, it is
not necessarily unconstitutional. 17 The court was probably forced to
conjure up this solution because otherwise it would have had to approve
of a law that was simply reckless and discordant. Thus, not only does
direct democracy create impolitic laws, but also it presents courts with
broad opportunities to expand the Bill of Rights.
Similarly, the Supreme Court had to address a question of the constitutionality of a Washington referendum that banned the mandatory
busing to school of any child. The facts of Washington v. Seattle School
DistrictNo. 1 118 are a paradigmatic example of the kinds of iconoclasm
114. Eule, supra note 21, at 1567.
115. 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990).
116. See id. at 310.
117. Eule would probably express some surprise that the court did find the law unconstitutional
in Yniguez; he had assumed that official English initiatives were unreachable by constitutional practice. See Eule, supra note 21, at 1567.
118. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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engendered by direct democracy. The City of Seattle was concerned that
its school system was not racially integrated, and so it voluntarily undertook an effort to desegregate its schools. 119 As an overt response to the
school board's plan, an organization drafted and brought a state-wide
initiative to ban school busing of children. 120 The initiative passed by a
wide margin. The Supreme Court, however, in a momentous case for
21
school desegregation, struck down the law as unconstitutional.'
Seattle School District No. 1 presents an interesting study in the
problems of direct democracy. Here was a local problem solved by a
universal solution. As the Court argued, "the initiative... has its most
pernicious effect on integration programs that do 'not arouse extraordinary controversy.' 122 Even assuming that the school board's decision
to integrate its schools by busing was incorrect in the case of Seattle does
not mean that it was incorrect in all instances. The solution painted with
far too broad a brush. The Court noted that "tihe longstanding desegregation programs in [other counties] have functioned for years without
creating undue controversy. Yet they have been swept away, along with
the Seattle Plan, by Initiative 350."123 A local problem, in a true democratic republic, should seek a local solution. With a representative system, the sole recourse of the people who disagreed with the Seattle
School Board was to vote them out of office. There is no reason to believe that this was not a sufficient solution. If the issue was so important
to the people of Seattle, they certainly could have used that as their criterion for voting on a candidate for the school board. The problem with
the state-wide solution is obvious; the residents of other areas, who are
not in any way affected by a school busing plan installed in Seattle, are
deciding the issue for the people of Seattle.' 24 It may be precisely because the people of Seattle, as a whole, supported the integration of their
schools by busing that outsiders wanted to upset that plan.
The Bill of Rights, in essence, becomes a flying buttress that cannot
fulfill its purpose to support the weight of direct democracy. Direct democracy is producing laws that the republican structure-not the Bill of
119. Id. at 461.
120. Id. at 461-63.

121. See id at 483-84.
122. Id (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 396 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
123. Id at 484 n.27.
124. This is one instance where even a local referendum for the people of Seattle was a more
desirable solution than the state-wide referendum. Although this Note would still disagree with the
principles of local initiatives and referenda, the risks involved with them are certainly less dangerous
because they involve much smaller areas and are more likely to involve homogeneous groups. Moreover, local initiatives and referenda do not have problems with constitutionality since the Guaranty
Clause only requires state-not local-governments to be in a Republican Form.
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Rights-is designed to prevent. As one commentator posed the problem:
"Under direct legislation, the task of safeguarding minority rights from
majority tyranny is effectively left to the courts" even though the Framers placed that responsibility in the hands of elected legislatures. 12 5 The
republican framework provided a "filtering effect.., whereby a representative refined his constituents' express views into his own conception of
wise public policy.' 26 The proponents of direct democracy have made
the Bill of Rights something that it simply is not: "the only line of defense against... tyranny." 127
When there is no representative filter, the people are getting to put
other people's rights to a vote. This was condemned movingly by Justice
Jackson in his defense of the First Amendment in West VirginiaBoard of

Education v. Barnette128:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities .... One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech... and other fundamental rights may 129
not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Although Justice Jackson was correct in stating that the Constitution did
"withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy," the Justice identifies the wrong source of this protection. First
and foremost, the Guaranty Clause protected individuals because it
forced all states to govern through representation. The representative
30
would be the "moderating influence" in the Madisonian scheme.
Governors, senators, members of Congress, the President, and state
legislators have one characteristic in common: They are all bound to
follow and uphold the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution itself requires this in Article VI, Clause 3.131 President George Bush
presented an example of his allegiance to the Constitution when he insisted that he could not sign the congressional version of the Civil Rights
125. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 188. Magleby convincingly cites James Madison's view that the
Constitution protected minority rights from legislation by "passing [the public views] through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens." THE FEDERALLr No. 10, at 73 (James Madison) (Charles
A. Beard ed., 1948). This idea of filtering seems at once to agree with and contradict Julian Eule's
filtering system. Eule views fitering as a solely judicial function, whereas the Madisonians view
fitering as a legislative function. See Eule, supra note 21, at 1525.
126. NANCY MAVEETY, REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND THE BURGER YEARS 99 (1991).

127. Eule, supra note 21, at 1584.
128. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
129. Id. at 638.
130. See MAVEETY, supra note 126, at 100.
131. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives [of the United States],
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the
United States and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this
Constitution.").
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Act of 1991 because he believed that it included an unconstitutional
quota. 132 In other words, the Constitution of the United States has
meaning, not only to the courts, but also to the drafters and signers of
legislation. This has especially important implications for state legislatures and governors. The California state constitution's oath of office, for
example, requires the governor and all the legislators to state, "I, ... , do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the
Constitution of the United States." 133 The oath should not be read as
merely pro forma; the Supreme Court has treated those state governments and legislatures that scoff at their oaths to be at "war against the
Constitution."1 3a4 In Cooper v. Aaron, 135 an opinion issued under the
names of all nine Justices, the Court held that the governor and the legislature of Arkansas were violating their constitutional oaths by not desegregating their public schools. The Court emphasized that not only were
state courts bound by the United States Constitution, but that the Gover136
nor and the legislature were as well.
It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion that direct democracy differs dramatically from state legislatures in that it offers no
such constitutional limitations upon those who draft referenda and initiatives. Direct democracy allows lay drafters of laws to contradict directly
the strictures of the Constitution. As common citizens, they are bound
by no oath to uphold the Constitution; those who write the referenda and
initiatives are under no duty or obligation to make sure what they are
drafting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the First
Amendment. They, in fact, may be completely unaware of the constitutional problems presented by their referendum or initiative. Or worse,
they may choose to use direct democracy to flout the Constitution or the
courts' interpretation of that document. Seattle School District No. 1
may be precisely such an example. When direct democracy bypasses the
representative system, the very core of the republican structure is tainted.
II. A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE GUARANTY CLAUSE
The Constitution gave the United States a duty to guarantee that all
state governments in the Union be of a Republican Form. Article IV,
132. Ann Devroy & Sharon LaFraniere, Bush Outlines Objections to Civil Rights Proposal President Says He Won't Sign 'Quota Bill,' WASH. PosT, May 18, 1990, at A6.
133. CAL. CoNsT. art. 20, § 3. But see MASS. CONsT. amend. 6 (amending id. ch. VI, art. I)
(requiring only allegiance to the state constitution). One might wonder about the constitutionality of
the Massachusetts oath in light of the requirements of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.
134. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 18-19.
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Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution states: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government
.. ..-137 The remainder of this Note will be devoted to trying to discover
what the Framer's intended in putting this Clause in the Constitution.
What did it mean---did it have any meaning at all?
A.

The Justiciabilityof the Guaranty Clause: Questioning the Political
Question Doctrine

In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon, 138 the only
Supreme Court case to raise the question of whether direct democracy
violated the Guaranty Clause, the Court decided to pass on the issue.
The Court held that the Guaranty Clause was non-justiciable because it
139
was a political question.
Justiciability is a concept that is not at all apparent upon first
glance; it is not found in the words of the Constitution. And, as every
law student knows, Marbury v. Madison 140 stated that it is emphatically
the province of the judiciary to say what the law is, and, more specifically, what the Constitution means. 14 1 The Guaranty Clause provided
the impetus for what was probably the most formatively important decision in political question doctrine. 142 The definitiveness of that decision
has been eroded by Baker v. Carr143 and the demise of the political question doctrine has been predicted for years. 144 The trend among commentators is to argue not over whether political question doctrine should be
scrapped, but, rather, how fast and how much it should be. 145 Indeed,
137. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
138. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
139. See id.at 151.
140. 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
141. See i. at 177. When faced with the prospect of jumping through the hoops of justiciability
doctrine, one may be tempted to skirt around them as do political scientists when faced with such
mundane tasks. See Andrew Levine ElectoralPower, Group Power, and Democracy, in 32 NoMos:
MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES 251, 251 (John W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer eds., 1990) ("It is
beyond my competence to provide arguments, grounded in Constitutional doctrine .... I am confident that with sufficient ingenuity, compelling legal arguments can be produced, and that in the right
political conditions they can prevail. I shall therefore leave Constitutional questions for others to
worry over .... ). As lawyers and law students, we have no such luxury.
142. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
143. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
144. See Arthur E. Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the ConstitutionalGuaranteeof Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 245 (1962). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-13, at 96-107 (1988); Martin H. Redish, JudicialReview and 'the
Political Question,' 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1985).
145. Compare Redish, supra note 144, at 1059-60 (arguing that the Supreme Court's resort to
the political question doctrine is an abdication of its Constitutional responsibilities and should be
abandoned) with Louis Henkin, Is There a 'PoliticalQuestion'Doctrine?,85 YALE L.J. 597, 600-25
(1976) (arguing that the doctrine is superfluous and a relic of another era).
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the reports of its demise have not been greatly exaggerated; in only one
case since Baker has the Supreme Court held that a question before it
was a non-justiciable political one. 146
Unlike any other provision of the Constitution, the Guaranty Clause

places the duty upon-not the Congress, not the executive, not the judiciary-but the United States. What is especially unique and frustrating
about the non-justiciability of the Guaranty of a Republican Form of

Government is that it "expresses the full limit of National control over
the internal affairs of a State," 147 while it is the only section of the Constitution which is per se non-justiciable.14 8 Although the Supreme Court
has acknowledged this apparent paradox, it has seemed willing to live
with it. 149
Some suggest, however, that the Guaranty of a Republican Form of
Government is about to fall from political question doctrine, and the
Court is merely preparing the way. Professor John Hart Ely expresses
the hope that "this unfortunate doctrine-that all Republican Form

cases are necessarily cases involving political questions-will wholly pass
from the scene one of these days."1 50 Ely makes two important observations: First, that this special per se rule can be easily excised without a
146. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); see also TRIE, supra note 144, at 105 (suggesting that because the case fell in the area of explicit authorization to a coordinate branch, the
Court had no choice but to invoke the doctrine). But see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)
(holding, by plurality, that the authority for the rescission of a treaty was a political question).
Even the deference to the executive in military matters has been eroded in political question
doctrine. A recent district court decision held challenges to the War Powers Act not to be barred by
the political question doctrine (while still holding it non-justiciable for lack of ripeness). See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). It is interesting to compare Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 19 (1827), which was cited with approval by both Chief Justice Taney in Luther, see 48
U.S. (7 How.) at 44 ("[a] question very similar to this"), and Justice Brennan in Baker, see 369 U.S.
at 213, with the recent decision of Perpich v. Department of Defense, 110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990). Martin
held the calling of militia to be a non-justiciable political question, see 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 30-32,
whereas in Perpich the Court never even touched the issue of whether the militia clauses were political questions and assumed the case was justiciable, see 110 S. Ct. at 2422-24. Perhaps it is revealing
that the opinion of the Court in Perpich noted that Article IV, Section 4 was closely related to the
militia clauses. See 110 S. Ct. at 2421-22 n.4 (Stevens, J.). The decision is important because it deals
with the exact issue that concerns the Guaranty Clause: whether the relationship between the states
and the federal government is an inherently political one. It is rather mystifying that the Court did
not touch on the justiciability of the case-or else it illustrates how far political question doctrine has
fallen.
147. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 454 (1905) (emphasis added).
148. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 146 (1912); Taylor v. Beckham, 178
U.S. 548, 578 (1900).
149. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. Perhaps the reason that the Court has held on so tenaciously to
the non-justiciability of the Guaranty Clause is because the original exposition on political question
doctrine involved that very clause. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42-43. To knock out the first
building block would threaten to collapse the entire doctrine.
150. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 118 n.* (1980).

Vol. 41:1267]

STATUS OFDIRECT DEMOCRACY

1293

wholesale departure from political question doctrine. Second, that recent
decisions of the Court must be read as signalling this trend. 151
Luther v. Borden 152 first crystallized the political question doctrine
when the Supreme Court refused to exercise its judicial power in a dispute over which government was the legitimate one in Rhode Island following the Dorr Rebellion. In this instance, the Court's acquiescence to
the political department was undoubtedly wise because to do otherwise
might have called into question the Court's authority. 153 What was at
issue was not what is "republican," but rather which government's claim
over the state of Rhode Island was more legitimate. There were no judicially manageable standards 5 4 nor any way for the Court to avoid making an inherently political decision. This reading of Luther turns not so
much on whether this was a question for Congress but whether this was a
question for the state. Later in its decision, the Court adverted to the
eventually momentous dictum that Article IV, Section 4 "rested with
Congress... to determine upon the means proper to be adopted to fulfil
this guarantee."' 5 5
Once Luther v. Borden had been decided, the outcome of Pacific
States Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon 156 was a foregone conclusion. In
Pacific States, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the
nation's first referendum system in the state of Oregon. The referendum
power was put into place by a state constitutional amendment 57 and was
used to enact a corporate tax of two percent on gross receipts.' 5 8 The
referendum device was upheld by the Supreme Court of Oregon' 59 and
the company appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court was emphatic
in holding that Luther was a "leading and absolutely controlling
case."' 6 And once it made that decision, the conclusion followed that
the case involved a political question, since the Guaranty clause was a
16 1
political question.
151. See id at 122-23.
152. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
153. See id at 38-39; see also ELY, supra note 150, at 118 n.*; WILLiAM WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTrTioN (1972).

154. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 39-40.
155. Id. at 43.
156. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
157. Id. at 134 n.1.
158. I at 135.
159. See Kadderly v. Portland, 74 P. 710 (Or. 1903).
160. PacificStates, 223 U.S. at 143.
161. Id. at 151.
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After so emphatically silencing the Guaranty Clause in Luther and
PacificStates, the Court in Baker v. Carr162 established a system for analyzing political question doctrine wherein upholding the non-justiciability of the Guaranty clause surprisingly did not fit. Of course
Justice Frankfurter was right in castigating the majority for the contradiction of reaffirming the principles of Luther and PacificStates while at
the same time finding no political question in a case that "in effect [was] a
163
Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label."
Frankfurter concluded, however, that the voter reapportionment case
presented a non-justiciable political question.
One can turn the argument around on Justice Frankfurter and argue
that Baker, in effect, overrules both Luther and Pacific States's holding
that the Guaranty Clause is per se non-justiciable. Luther and Pacific
States are understandably non-justiciable because they involved the impermissible judicial meddling in a state's political affairs. But the majority in Baker rejected that position emphatically in holding that political
questions are those that involve the "relationship between the judiciary
and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the
federal judiciary's relationship to the States."164 That Justice Brennan
used the Guaranty Clause cases to support this position is virtually incomprehensible, given that both Taney's opinion in Luther and White's
opinion in Pacific States focused on the relationship between the judiciary and the state and only tangentially on the relationship of the judiciary to the coordinate branches of the government.
The Baker v. Carr majority stands on moving ground; it either has
to follow Frankfurter's retreat back into political question doctrine or
move with Ely and resurrect the Guaranty Clause. To remain in the
middle is doctrinally illogical. The illogic lies in the Court's statements,
on the one hand, that justiciability is not "wholly and immediately foreclosed,"1 65 and, on the other hand, that the justiciability of the Guaranty
Clause is wholly and immediately foreclosed. Does not the Guaranty
Clause deserve the determination "whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded"? 166 Others have
pointed out, with more specificity than this Note will do, that the criteria
67
that Brennan set out to determine whether or not a case is justiciable
162.
163.
164.
165.

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id at 210 (emphasis added).
Id. at 198.

166. Id.
167. Id. at 217.
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are met by a Guaranty Clause case. One Note argues that the Guaranty.
Clause, since it is textually committed to "The United States," 168 means
that "all three branches are responsible for enforcing" it.169 Professor
Eule also agrees. 170 The federal courts could certainly address themselves
directly to the determination of the meaning of the Guaranty Clause, and
sweep away this "unfortunate" doctrine of its nonjusticiability.
Moreover, Professor Ely suggests the argument that, following
Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court implicitly began to acknowledge the
justiciability of the Guaranty Clause. 17 1 In Reynolds v. Sims, 172 the
Court again returned to the issue raised by Baker v. Carr, whether a
voter apportionment scheme could constitutionally dilute a citizen's vote.
The Court held that such a scheme was unconstitutional because the
Equal Protection Clause guaranteed to each citizen an equal vote. While
one will not find an explicit discussion of the justiciability of the Guaranty Clause in Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court, he employs
all the terms and logic of a Guaranty Clause case. It makes no sense for
the Court to hold the criteria to decide a Guaranty Clause case judicially
unmanageable while cavalierly employing the same criteria in an Equal
Protection Clause case.
The Court specifically stated that "in a society ostensibly grounded
on representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority
of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State's legislators." 173 The Court tried to portray this as a part of "the concept of
equal protection" as it "has been traditionally viewed."' 174 The Court in
Reynolds could not have reached such a conclusion without first implicitly finding that State governments were "ostensibly grounded on representative government." Warren added the word "ostensibly" to qualify
his declaration, because he realized that there was no way to reach such a
conclusion without invoking the Republican Form found in the Guaranty Clause. But Ely argues that since Warren's view was nonsensical
without such a grounding, it must be read as a case which implicates the
168. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 4.
169. Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirabilityof Legislating
by Initiativ, 61 S.CAL. L. Rnv. 733, 767 (1988). The Note also considers the Baker criteria of "a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards," "the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination," and "lack of the respect due to coordinate branches of government,"
369 U.S. at 217, and concludes that none of them should bar the justiciability of the Guaranty
Clause. Fountaine, supra, at 766.
170. Eule, supra note 21, at 1542-43.
171. ELY, supra note 150, at 122-23.
172. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
173. Id. at 565.
174. Id.
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Guaranty of a Republican Form of Government: "Thus to be intelligible, Reynolds v. Sims... must be approached as the joint product of the
Equal Protection and Republican Form Clauses."1 75 The Court, then,
has already done the work to place the Guaranty Clause back into the
realm of justiciability.
B.

What Is a Republican Form of Government?

If the courts do find that the Guaranty Clause is not a political question, they must delineate some criteria to determine whether direct democracy violates the Clause. What is a republican form of government?
Is representative government a necessary and sufficient condition for a
republican form of government? These are necessarily difficult questions
because they involve reconstructing the history of our Republic and using words that have changed in meaning over the centuries. But these
questions are no more difficult than asking what is "equal protection" or
"cruel and unusual punishment." As Justice Frankfurter stated in Baker
v. Carr, "[c]ertainly 'equal protection' is no more secure a foundation for
judicial judgment of the permissibility of varying forms of representative
government than is 'Republican Form.'"176 Just because courts must
necessarily make the difficult decisions does not mean the answers are
ineffable. On the contrary, Chief Justice Marshall's words confer a responsibility upon courts to make the hard decisions: "It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."177

1. The Fictionof PopularSovereignty and DirectDemocracy. The
argument that direct democracy is not a republican form of government
would appear, at first blush, counterintuitive. If the people are sovereign
and all power is granted by them, how can it be that they cannot reassert
their power? 178 The sovereignty argument has much rhetorical force, but
it has rarely been closely examined. The Court in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon 179 adverted to the sovereignty syllogism,
stating in dicta that they did not see any logic to the telephone company's
175. ELY, supra note 150, at 122.
176. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300-01 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter, however, reached the conclusion that neither was reliable, whereas this Note argues that
although both are equally difficult inquiries, they are not impossible to plumb.
177. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

178. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), makes the general argument that the states
can only have as much power as the people give them. See also LAURENCE H. TRINE, GOD SAVE
THIS HONORABLE COURT 5 (1985) ("The people of the nation remain the sovereign, and all the
coercive power they have delegated to the government may be exercised only pursuant to the law.").
179. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
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argument when "[tihe ultimate power of sovereignty is in the people, and
they in the nature of things . .. must have a right to change their
constitution."13 0
The concept of popular sovereignty, however, is not as concrete as
the argument may suggest. Consider the validity of the following argument: The Parliament of England has only so much power as the sovereign grants it. Parliament, bottlenecked by political divisiveness, decides
to return legislative power to the sovereign. The only problem is that the
sovereign is the Queen. No one would question the absurdity of such a
result.181 Is there any theoretical difference between our sovereign, the
people, and the sovereign of England, the Queen? Or is it a merely a
rhetorical tool?
Recent historical analysis suggests that one should not place too
much faith in the idea of popular sovereignty and its implications in our
constitutional scheme. Popular sovereignty, at bottom, is a myth-a fiction. The people were never sovereign, but were led to believe so by the
-Federalist propaganda. Professor Edmund Morgan contends that
"[James] Madison was inventing a sovereign American people to overcome the sovereign states."' 1 2 The people reserved no sovereign power
because they never had any power to begin with; popular sovereignty was
a mere empty promise from the Framers. Alexander Hamilton put it
more bluntly, perhaps, in arguing that the Constitution was creating an
aristocratic republic, that the people should be drawn naturally to a monarchy that was the perfect paternalistic blueprint. 183 But knowing the
states and the people could not swallow such an idea, the "fiction" of
popular sovereignty sprung from Madison's mind. Popular sovereignty
rests on an idea, albeit an appealing and visionary one, but nonetheless
an inchoate idea. Thus, Marshall's classic statement that this was a government of laws, not people, was truer than the people wanted to believe.
180. Id. at 145.
181. Caution should be taken not to take the analogy too far; it is merely an illustration that the
idea of sovereignty is not at all clear, nor a foundational principle of our government. One interesting look at political mythology compared British children's retention in the belief of the Queen as
their defacto ruler and American belief in concepts such as popular sovereignty. See ROBERT A.
DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSION 168-75 (1971). Dahl notes that the English
lose their cognitive belief in the Queen as ruler as they grow older, whereas Americans retain their
mythological view of sovereignty. See also R.R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800, THE CHALLENGE
239-40 (1959).
182. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 267.
183. See GERALD STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN Gov-

ERNMENT 38-40 (1970); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 361-67 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Charles A. Beard ed., 1948) (Hamilton argued that there was no need for a bill of rights).
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2. A Stab at a HistoricalDefinition of Republican. Insofar as the
syllogism of direct democracy rests on popular sovereignty, it is an argument whose validity is a chimera. Direct democracy must retreat to
more concrete ground, to the text of the Constitution. What was envisioned by the Framers to be constitutional forms of republican government? Professor Bruce Ackerman states the foundation principle of the
Republic: "[T]he age of the polis is long passed .... Only an extensive
republic will embrace the diverse population required to provide the social foundations for liberal politics. This means that the best we can hope
for is a representative democracy ....
184 Does the "best," however,
translate into the only form in our constitutional scheme? Ackerman
leaves the question unanswered, but the Framers of our Republic surely
185
did not.
Prior to the time of the ratification of the Constitution, no state had
a direct democracy, nor was any contemplating one. One commentator
asserts that the Framers would have responded with abject horror if they
knew that direct democracy was practiced by the states, for democracy
was a word that "denoted the lowest order of society [and] was generally
associated with the threat of civil disorder." 18 6 There is some evidence to
suggest that this was true in the prerevolutionary debate over whether to
have instructions from the people to their representative on how to vote
on a certain bill. The instruction was prevalent in the prerevolutionary
period,187 especially in what is today New England, and soon there was a
movement to make the instruction mandatory, i.e., the representative
would be required to follow the people's instruction. But this "movement to make instructions binding failed completely.
. .
[R]epresentatives in England and America have never been legally or
constitutionally bound to follow the instructions .... ,, 18s Edmund Morgan asserts that the instruction was another product of the fiction of popular sovereignty and that the Framers wisely refused to let it become part
of our Republic.1 8 9
184. BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 305-06 (1980) [hereinafter AcKERmAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE] (emphasis added). Ackerman seems to have retreated somewhat
from this position in his new work. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 54-55 (1991). He
now advocates a reinvigoration of a national referendum system, so that the people, rather than the
courts, can transform the Constitution. See id

185. See

BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

282-83 (1967).
186. Id. at 282. John Marshall was to have said at the Virginia Convention, "Can the whole
aggregate community act personally? I apprehend that every gentleman will see the impossibility of
this." BOYLE, supra note 8, at 114 (arguing against the passage of state referendum laws).
187. See MORGAN, supra note 5, at 213. See generally REID, supra note 48, at 96-109.
188. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 215.
189. See id. at 230-33.
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What was the understanding of republican at the time of the drafting of the Constitution? Direct democracy proponents cite Locke and
Rousseau as supporting direct action of the people. 190 They should look
elsewhere for their support, argue several historians.'91 Morgan criticizes those supporters of popular sovereignty who used John Locke's
Two Treatises on Government 192 to bolster the ideological backing for
replacing the English monarchy with a parliamentary system.193 In fact,
Locke's conception of the people's power was "profoundly conservative"
and in his view "[t]he English people never, even fictionally, exercised
their constituent power outside Parliament. They acted only through
their representatives in the House of Commons."' 194
Rousseau, too, "complained bitterly" of those who misconceived his
division of government and sovereignty. 195 To Rousseau, "the glory of
republican citizens" was not in popular activity but rather "in obeying
their legitimate magistrates."' 1 96 Democracy, at best, was a vision of utopia, but an unrealistic one. So the best function served by the people was
"symbolic and ritualistic. They actually do very little."' 97 These are
merely illustrative of how fraught with difficulty it is to use history to
justify ideology.
The Constitutional Convention debates are hardly illuminating in
defining what the Framers meant by republican. James Madison's notes
on the Guaranty Clause debate could be printed here without substantially increasing the page length of this Note. 98 The reason for the
Framers' inattention in defining their terms is that they had a common
190. One particularly egregious example of misunderstanding Rousseau is found in CRONIN,
supra note 1:
The central idea of Rousseau's political theories is that the people, being subject to the
laws, ought to be their authors. The moment people allow themselves to be represented,
they surrender their freedom. Thus, every law that the people have not ratified directly is
invalid; it is not a true law.
Id at 39.
191. See MORGAN, supra note 5, at 105; JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MEN AND CITIZENS: A STUDY
OF ROUSSEAU'S SociAL THEORY (2d ed. 1985).
192. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947) (1690).
193. See MORGAN, supra note 5, at 105-06.
194. Id at 255-56.
195. SHKLAR, supra note 191, at 19.
196. Id (quoting Rousseau).
197. Id. at 20; see also Maurice Cranston, Introduction to JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SoCIAL CONTRACT 30-31 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762) (arguing that Rousseau "used the word 'democracy' in a rather distinctive fashion" and that it "might be less confusing
to speak of him as a 'republican' ").
198. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 320-22 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1920).

1300

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:1267

understanding of the meaning of "republican." They could not have anticipated the consternation that the ambiguity of the definition of republican would cause among contemporary historians and constitutional
scholars.
The Guaranty Clause debate was centered on some confusion over
the original expression of the Clause as it was introduced: "That a Republican Constitution & its existing law ought to be guarantied to each
State by the U. States." 199 On the one hand, some of the Framers seemed
to view the Republican Form of Government Clause as a way for the
general government to "suppress Rebellions, '20 0 and the sole "object of
the clause was to merely secure the States agst. dangerous commotions,
insurrections and rebellions. '20 1 On the other hand, one may infer from
the comments of other participants that they believed that the Guaranty
Clause set limits on the constitutional structures adopted by the several
states. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania stated that he found the
clause "very objectionable" because he was "very unwilling" to see the
laws and constitution of Rhode Island guaranteed by the United
States. 20 2 Morris's view seems to support the argument that a Republic
was a well-defined and delimited form of government in the minds of the
Framers. Another Framer also agreed with Morris and stated that he
"was afraid of perpetuating the existing Constitutions of the States. '20 3
The implicit reasoning of these two is that both believed that the constitutions of many states were not of a Republican Form, and that they
would not want to be read as certifying any non-republican constitutions.
When both views of the Guaranty Clause seemed to be talking past each
other, Edmund Randolph of Virginia rose to clarify the issue for both
camps, stating that the Guaranty had two distinct parts: "1. to secure
Republican Government. 2. to suppress domestic commotions. He
urged the necessity of both these provisions. ' ' 20 4 When the final version
was suggested, the two expressions were both included in the Guaranty
205
Clause.
The conclusion, though, that the Guaranty Clause had two objects-to secure the Republican Form of Government in the states and to
protect against internal rebellion-does not help define "republican."
The only way to glean the Framers' meaning of "republican" is to go
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id at 320.
Id at 321 (Luther Martin of Maryland).
Id (James Wilson of Pennsylvania).
Id at 320.
Id at 321 (William Houston of New Jersey).
Id (emphasis added).
See id at 322 (James Wilson).
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through the entire structure of the Constitution and see how the Republican Form was integral to that structure. In fact, the Guaranty Clause
was raised frequently as an important aspect of the Constitution.
The FederalistPapers more clearly define the requirement of representation in a republican form of government. 20 6 Madison, for one,
could not have been more explicit in condemning direct democracy in a
republic: "The true distinction [of] ... the American Governments, lies
in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity .... -"207 He
observed that the absence of representation led to the danger of "particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful
misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they
themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn." 20 8 His admonition is probably too kind. Majorities normally do
not retreat from their dangerous positions but cling desperately to them.
Critics of utilitarianism make the normative observation that majorities
are inherently dangerous because the utility of a majority suppressing the
minority may outweigh the relatively slight disutility of a passive minority victim. 20 9 In other words, it is absurd to expect a majority to control
itself, because in its view it is more utilitarian to carry out its tyranny.
To Madison, representation was a necessary and sufficient condition
of a republic because it served as the most important barrier to
majoritarian tyranny. He took care to define his terms: "A republic, by
which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes
place, ... promises the cure. 2 10 He cautioned that one not forget the
"great points of difference between a democracy and a republic. 2 11
James Madison arose from a proud tradition of liberalism that had a
respect for the voice of the people, but a fear of the unchecked power of
their sovereignty. John Stuart Mill wrote:
[W]hen society is itself the tyrant-society collectively over the separate individuals who compose it-its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political
fumctionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates; and if it
206. As Ely points out, however, we must keep in mind that the FederalistPapers are merely
after-the-fact propaganda designed to ensure the Constitution's safe passage through the state conventions. See ELY, supra note 150, at 5.
207. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 269 (James Madison) (Charles Beard ed., 1948). For an excellent discussion of the Madisonian rejection of pure democracy, see MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY,
THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONsTrrTTIoN 136-45 (1987).

208. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 207, at 268.
209. See BARBER, supra note 39, at 18 (blaming this on liberalism and its version of "thin"
democracy).
210. See THE FEDERAI.ST No. 10, supra note 125, at 72 (James Madison).
211. Id at 73.
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issues wrong'mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in
things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny
more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since... it
leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the
details of life, and enslaving the soul itself ... [T]here needs protection
...against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, against
the tendency of society to impose ... its own ideas and practices as
rules of conduct on those who dissent from them .... 212

Mill's point is that when the people, rather than just a monarch, tyrannize, that tyranny brings with it a power to make others conform to their
model of conduct. This, as Michel Foucault has said in other contexts,
"compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short,
it normalizes." 2 13 It is one thing to rail against the tyranny of the magistrate; it is quite another to protest against the disapprobation of your
entire society. It is the most damaging dnd of judgment because it
brings with it the greatest psychological power to force others to
conform.

2 14

Some carry Madison's vision to its far more revealing conclusionthat the Guaranty Clause protects individualrights. John Hart Ely suggestively posits that the Guaranty Clause should be read as a complement to the Fourteenth Amendment to protect rights of the people. 2 15
There is some reason to believe that some of the Framers viewed the
Guaranty Clause in the same light. In the debate over whether the Constitution should have a bill of rights, Alexander Hamilton argued that a
bill of rights would be superfluous because the Constitution provides "securities to republican government, to liberty, and to property... in the
express guaranty of a republican form of government. '2 16 Thus the
212. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 63 (Gertrude Himmelfard ed., Penguin Books 1982) (1859).
See generally Robert L. Simon, Pluralism and Equality: The Status of Minority Values in a Democracy, in 32 NoMos: MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES, supra note 141, at 207, 215-221 (describing
some of the defenses of pluralism in a democratic state).
.

213.

MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON

183 (Alan

Sheridan trans., 1977).
214. See Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 174 (Eleanor E. Maccoby et al. eds., 3d ed.
1958). The Asch study gave a chilling illustration of the power of societal pressure to force a person
to discount her own perceptions when they conflicted with the perceptions of the majority. The
study had subjects walk into a room and try to identify which line among a group presented before
them was longer than the others. The study's conspirators would choose one of the lines as longer
though it clearly was not longer. The subjects would often deny their own senses and accede to their
peers in the room and agree with their wrong view. Asch believed this revealed that "[i]ndividuals
are highly sensitive to the structufal qualities of group opposition." Id. at 183.
215. See ELY, supra note 150, at 122.
- 216. THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 368 (Alexander Hamilton) (Charles A. Beard ed., 1948). It
should be noted, however, that Hamilton probably had the most aberrant interpretation of what a
"Republic" was. On the one hand, he believed that it disallowed all titles of nobility, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 183, at 362, but at the same time he thought a monarchy was the
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Guaranty Clause, in conjunction with the constitutional structure of the
republic, would obviate the need for a specific bill of fights because the
minority's interests would never be put into danger. Although this view
might strike some as naive (and perhaps a bit disingenuous), it does give
weight to Ely's argument that the Framers did not intend the Guaranty
Clause to be an empty vessel.
The definitive view of the constitutional scheme, Madison's and the
Federalists', had no place for direct democracy. The Framers envisioned
a Republican Form of Government to be one that had a representative
system. No other kind could protect against the dangers of majoritarian
tyranny. As Eule acknowledges, direct democracy is "constitutionally
suspect, ' 2 17 but more than that, it has carved out a hallowed place in a
constitutional scheme to which it has no claim of even belonging. Eule
argues that the Guaranty Clause is a mere filter to state action, but as
Hamilton pointed out, it was the only filter (until a bill of rights) in the
Constitution. Thus it cannot be at the same "fiter" level but is rather the
threshold inquiry to all state action, before any filtering happens.
3. Strange Bedfellows: Direct Democracy and Civic Republicanism. If we suppose that the Constitution is a living, changing document, how does the changing conception of "republican" bear on the
constitutionality of direct democracy? Professor Ely, for one, suggests
that such an inquiry is not outrageous: "Neither is there anything special
about the Republican Form Clause that suggests that a line of growth or
development (like that the Court has given virtually every other constitutional phrase) would be inappropriate. ' 2 18 One place where the line has
not yet been clearly drawn is between civic republicans and liberals. The
most important debate in the recent past has been over the republican
model of governance and its view of liberalism. It is a defining moment,
now, for direct democracy to become a tool of either one movement or
the other. The last century has shown that direct democracy is illiberal,
but this Note will show that it is also counter-republican; direct democracy falls into neither ideological camp, and civic republicans should realize this and be repelled by it.
best republican form of government. See STOuRzH, supra note 183, at 38-41. Many of his fellow
Federalists disagreed with the idea that a monarchy was a republican form of government. Hamilton lamented to his dying days that the absence of a monarchy would eventually fell the nascent
republic. Id. at 39. In other words, Hamilton goes thefurthest in distrusting democracy; he would
rather accept the necessary evil of a monarchy than turn over rule to the people.
217. Eule, supra note 21, at 1545. It is all the more amazing that Professor Eule tries to straddle
the middle over the constitutionality of direct democracy after he makes this concession. How can a
"hard look" by the courts somehow make that which is unrepublican republican?
218. ELY, supra note 150, at 123 (footnote omitted).
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Civic republicanism has gained a political cachet among contemporary intellectuals, especially conservatives, and provides a broad theoretical basis for political reform. The legal academy has taken it, too, and
threatens to turn it into a beast of its own. 219 Civic republicanism is a

historical movement that tried to identify western and American political
thought as being rooted in republicanism. 220 This largely descriptive
project became transformed into an ideology by a merger with the philo-

sophical movement known as communitarianism. 221 The two effected
this merger because they had a common enemy-liberalism. 222 Liberalism adheres to the view that individual rights have primacy over the
polity; the ultimate search in the liberal model is to find absolute, univer-

sal moral imperatives to protect the individual. Civic, or prescriptive,

republicanism 223 emphasizes that moral values-what the Greeks called
virtue--have meaning only in relation to their contexts;2 24 liberalism has

removed itself from morality's contextual terrain and, thus, has lost itself.225 The only way to reorient morality is to return to a community
219. For a view of the breadth of the movement, see the Symposium issue in the Yale Law
Journal,The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493-1723 (1989). Among the participants
were Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein. As Bruce Ackerman explains the recent revival among
the lemming-like legal community, "wouldn't it be foolish for lawyers to ignore the 'republican
revival' among American historians?" ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 184, at 25.
220. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREA-

TION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958); BAILYN, supra note 185.
221. See MACINTYRE, supra note 11; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS o JUSTICE (1982);
WALZER, supra note 38; BARBER, supra note 39.
222. The evil of liberalism, to those like MacIntyre, is that it emphasizes individual rights (which
arrive in absolute, not contextual, terms) over community values. For the classic work on modem
liberalism, see JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see also ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE,
supra note 184. MacIntyre identifies liberalism as the root of the "unsettable character of so much
contemporary moral debate" and "the pluralism which threatens to submerge us all." MACINTYRE,

supra note 11, at 226.
223. Civic republicanism is a synonym for communitarianism and prescriptive republicanism.
Paul Brest pointed out that the term civic republicanism is probably redundant, so he preferred
republicanism or the republican revival. FurtherBeyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical
Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 n.1 (1988). I will use civic republicanism for simplicity's
sake, because it is the current term used by most legal scholars.
224. See MACINTYRE, supra note 11, at 273. MacIntyre insists that morality, or what he calls
an account of the virtues, "can only be elaborated and possessed within an ongoing social tradition."
Therefore he is exercised by any liberal search for universal truths; to communitarians, there is no
such thing.
225. One communitarian describes the difference between the two movements: "[W]here the
liberal regards the expansion of individual rights and entitlements as unqualified moral and political
progress, the communitarian is troubled by the tendency of liberal programmes to displace politics
from smaller forms of association to more comprehenisve ones." Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to
LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 6 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).
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model of government where traditions and virtues bind together the
members of the community. Therefore, moral imperatives-in their
22 6
proper contexts-will be reinvigorated.
On its face, direct democracy seems to dovetail nicely with the revival of civic republicanism; what better way to allow the community to
27
reassert itself than by letting the people vote? Both Michael Walzer7
and Benjamin Barber 228 take up the communitarian call, and come forward with participatory democratic frameworks to institutionalize civic
republicanism. Walzer's framework for a community is quite subtle in
stating the kinds of participation that are acceptable. In Spheres of Justice, he emphasizes a structure in which social goods are distributed into
spheres across the whole panoply of one's life: the government, the
school, the workplace, the church, and the individual level. Within each
sphere he encourages vigorous participation, but participation takes the
form of the "citizen ... be[ing] ready and able, when his time comes, to
deliberate with his fellows, listen and be listened to."229 Walzer makes
clear that a citizen is not guaranteed equal power but merely equal opportunity to exercise one's political power.230 He, therefore, rejects the
"push-button referenda" as "only another example of the erosion of
value-a false and ultimately degrading way of sharing in the making of
decisions."' 23 1 Walzer reaches this moment, I believe, for two reasons.
First, as a communitarian, he is sensitive to the constant criticism by
liberals that communitarianism abhors pluralism and may result in tyranny. 232 Second, he clearly sees the mistake of trying to adopt a mythological view of the Greekpolis and to foist it on modern society. In fact,
Walzer agrees that the "great orator has long since lost his dominance,1 233 meaning that the Greek polls has succumbed on the political
234
landscape.
226. A discussion of the relative merits of liberalism and communitarianism is far beyond the
scope of this Note. This Note only analyzes how well direct democracy fits within the communitarian model and whether commilnitarians should adopt direct democracy as one of its institutions. I
employ criticisms of communitarianism, not for substantive force, but to show how direct democracy
does not fit together well within the communitarian model.
227. See WALZER, supra note 38.
228. See BARBER, supra note 39.
229. WALZER, supra note 38, at 310.
230. See id at 309.
231. Id at 306-07. Walzer rejects direct democracy even while hypothesizing a system of full
information, informed citizens, and healthy dialogue. He simply sees this as "[t]he casual or arbitrary exercise of power" and ultimately "morally unsatisfying politics." Id. at 310.
232. The last pages of his book address the problem of tyranny in a communitarian state. See id
at 312.
233. Id. at 304.
234. Walzer notes that "[u]nder modem conditions, [a citizen participating in the polis] would
have to attend to a much greater variety of settings---committees, caucuses, parties, interest groups,
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Barber, however, has no such misgivings about reconstructing the
polls and advocating direct democracy in Strong Democracy. Barber's
"strong democracy" system
rests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are
united less by homogeneous interests than by civic education and who
are made capable of common purpose and mutual action by virtue of
their civic attitudes and participatory
institutions rather than their al235
truism or their good nature.
A close examination of Barber's language reveals his deep ties to civic
republicanism. Embedded in this brief passage is a beckon to the alliterative "community," "civic education," and "common purpose," and an
attack on the usual suspects-liberal-sounding concepts such as "altruism" or "good." Upon this community, Barber wants to rest a system
where representative democracy is pushed aside in favor of direct democratic practice.2 36 Included in these institutions will be a new, and new237
fangled, initiative process.
Barber's framework, however, rests on false premises. First, his
conception of community is nonsensical. Barber explicitly states that his
conception of the "community" is "united less by homogeneous interests
than by civic education." This definition of community has no meaning,
however. Barber has a problem: His concept of community is logically
incompatible with heterogeneous groups and large numbers of people.
The meaning of community requires, as stated by MacIntyre, that they
remain in "local forms" and relatively homogeneous, not pluralistic and
universal, forms. 238 But Barber wants to build community not only out
of localities but out of states and nation-states. He therefore grafts on
this idea that community can be derived from mere "civic education"
and need not undergo an immersion in community values as MacIntyre
requires. This, however, is another example of what MacIntyre might
term nonsense-when we use the key terms of analysis in our own way,
2 39
for our own purposes but have really lost all meaning of those terms.
and so on-and then to a greater variety of rhetorical styles." Iadat 304. The polis is not something
that can be easily reimposed on an American society that has exponentially changed from ancient
times.
235. BARBER, supra note 39, at 117.
236. See id.at 261-311.
237. See id at 281-98. The specifics of Barber's referendum instrument are discussed supra text
accompanying notes 108-13.
238. See MAcINTYRE, supra note 11, at 263 (emphasis added). A recent piece by Professor Lea
Brilmayer illustrates the current uncertainty of the meaning of community. See Lea Brilmayer,
Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1 (1991). Brilmayer suggests that there
may be such a thing as a "world community." Id. at 22. The term is a virtual oxymoron;

MacIntyre's concept of community necessitates the finding that American society, let alone the
world as a whole, "cannot hope to achieve moral consensus." MACINTYRE, supra note 11, at 252.
239. See MACINTYRE, supra note 11, at 1-2.
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Without a concept of community that can ground his framework, Barber
has a project in free-fall. If there is no theoretical basis for strong democracy, what practical hope is there for the success of this framework? This
is simply another misconception of the polity and another project-not
unlike the progressive movement of the early part of the century 24m about to hit the ground with a thud.
Barber's unremitting attack on liberalism suggests another practical
problem. Barber rehashes the arguments that lost over two centuries ago
at the Constitutional Convention. For example, Barber insists that representative government is incompatible with freedom, equality, and social justice. 24 1 Barber is taking his framework so outside the
Constitution that it has no practical force.242
Finally, aside from the theoretical inconsistencies, Barber ignores
the practical problems with mixing communitarianism and direct democracy. Direct democracy's great weakness is its inability to curb the
majoritarian will; communitarianism's great vulnerability is to
majoritarian tyranny. Together, the situation is ripe for disaster. One
commentator cogently argues that it is the very groups that are in need of
protection (what he calls the "marginal persons" 243) that are placed at
risk by communitarianism:
It is precisely because these groups are demanding more than the
"community" or the polity wishes to grant them that these controversies exist in the first place. Thus, any "renewal" . . . of community...
will accomplish nothing... ; for them, the existence of any community
is part of the problem, not part of the solution. 244
Communitarianism is designed for the "homogeneous" and the "tiny
political unit"; so the problems of "marginal persons" are only exacerbated by increasing the size of the political unit. To illustrate this point,
consider two communities, A and B. A is of one race, B is of another
race, and A is substantially larger than B. When the two are separate
homogeneous communities, the marginalized members of those communities are relatively small in number, for example, the disabled in community A and members of a third race who live within B. If, however,
the political unit is increased whereby A and B become one whole unit, it
240. See supra Part I(A).
241. See BARBER, supra note 39, at 145-46.
242. Perhaps this is unfair to Barber; he may not care at all whether his framework is constitutional or not, because he is concerned more with theoretically sound frameworks and not with the
mundane and largely irrelevant arguments of judicial review.
243. See Hirsch, supra note 27, at 424. Hirsch gives as examples of marginal people, the disabled, aliens, and homosexuals. Ia
244. Id.
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is clear that suddenly the members of B additionally become a marginalized group. Although this is merely a schematic illustration, it does
show why Barber's framework is extraordinarily dangerous, 245 especially
24 6
if his definition of community is wrong.
What theoreticians have to begin to realize about civic republicanism is that it is generally a philosophical movement and not given easily
to practical application. In MacIntyre's vision of morality, community
and virtue are inextricably intertwined with one another. One cannot
piecemeal choose what parts of community to adopt and which to reject;
they must go together or else they are meaningless. 247 Barber's attempt
to take the parts of community that he likes, reshape them and meld
them with his own, and then apply it, is an impossibility. Ultimately,
this definition of community is so inelastic that any attempt to stretch it
to encompass direct democracy will fail. Civic republicans must either
side with Walzer in rejecting direct democracy, or travel with Barber into
the "new dark ages." 24

When Roger Maris of the New York Yankees hit his sixty-first
home run against the Boston Red Sox on October 1, 1961, he surpassed
the legendary achievement of Babe Ruth, who had hit sixty home runs in
1927.249 This straightforward history is complicated by the fact that
Maris accomplished his feat in a season that had 162 games, whereas
Ruth had only 154. The controversy created a fiction: that Roger
Maris's single season home run record would go into the record books
with an asterisk next to it indicating that he had done it in a 162-game
season. As a point of fact, no asterisk ever existed; most baseball encyclopedias merely included both Maris's record and Ruth's record under
the same heading. But the myth of the asterisk had more power than the
reality. The people began to believe that the asterisk existed; debate
raged over whether the asterisk should be excised or not. The myth of
245. See Adeno Addis, Individualism. Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities,
66 NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 1219, 1251, 1261 (1991).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 235-39.
247. Unfortunately, Bruce Ackerman's newest work arrived too late to be addressed more cogently by this Note. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 184. Ackerman suggests that we
dispense with the schism between liberalism and republicanism. See id. at 29. He envisions a dualist
democracy in the United States that incorporates parts from both visions of the Republic.
248. The term is MacIntyre's. MACINTYRE, supra note 11, at 263.
249. See Murray Chass, Maris's FeatFinally Recognized 30 Years After Hitting61 Homers, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 5, 1991, at B12; Shirley Povich, Frick's "Asterisk" Demeaned Maris, WASH. PosT,
Sept. 7, 1991, at D7.
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the asterisk was altering reality, so much so that Maris's accomplishment
was being corrupted by the asterisk.
In 1991, thirty years after Maris's feat, the Committee on Statistical
Accuracy led by Commissioner Fay Vincent announced that the asterisk
was to be removed from record books. With this announcement (and its
accompanying press releases and press conferences), Fay Vincent shattered the myth. Vincent's statement that "[t]his change allows Roger
Mars to receive the recognition he deserves .... -"250 sounds ridiculous.
How would the elimination of something that did not exist make any
difference in the real world? But Vincent was right. To ignore the myth
would have been to allow it to thrive and reify itself. To address it as a
myth and disassemble it-although it appears redundant--destroyed the
myth. Roger Maris's son said with seeming relief, "Obviously, it's great.
I never felt it should have been put there to begin with."251 But, of
course, it never had been put there to begin with.
The mythology of direct democracy, too, has to be excised from our
constitutional context. It never was there, and never should have been
there-but, paradoxically, it is there. We want to believe that we have a
governmental structure that we simply do not have. To destroy the
myth, one should listen to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' words in Bi252
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Equalization Board:
The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town
meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes ... are passed
that affect the person or the property of individuals, sometimes to the
point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights
are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society,25by
3
their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.
On the one hand, we have to see the reality that we have a system that
can put us at the "point of ruin, without giving [us] a chance to be
heard." This is a stark reality, but it yields a more important role for the
citizen ("the only way.., in a complex society") to exercise her "power"
over her representatives. Our system is premised on our representatives--our legislatures-being held accountable for the decisions they
make. Once we begin to see the legislature, not as an obstacle to action,
but as a vehicle to action, we can truly begin to recover the governance of
250. William Gildea, Straight Up: Maris 61, Ruth 60; Stats Committee Also Declares Haddix
Game Imperfect, WASH. Posr, Sept. 5, 1991, at BI (quoting Fay Vincent, Commissioner of

Baseball).
251. IdL (quoting Roger Mais, Jr.).
252. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
253. Id. at 445. This case is a seminal one in administrative law, but its sentiments are apposite
to direct democracy.
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our affairs. The longer we are led astray by the myth of direct democracy, the further we are from regaining our Republic.

